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I. INTRODUCTION
The right of an individual to appear with representation when
the individual is subject to investigation is an expanding right in our
legal system. Where the individual once stood alone before the
investigator, now he or she may frequently have a right to appear
with the aid and comfort of another person.
This question of representation is increasingly being raised in
labor relations.' It is the usual practice to have the recognized union
* B.A., University of Washington, 1958; LL.B., New York University School of Law,
1961; Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law.
' See Right to Demand Union Representation During Investigative Interview by Em-
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represent the employee in presenting his grievances to the
employer, 2 as when, for example, he feels that his discharge or
discipline was improper. Recent cases have considered the question
of whether to expand the right of representation to cover earlier
points in the industrial relations process. Employees are occasionally
subjected to an individual meeting with the employer in a pre-
discipline or pre-discharge situation, such as one in which the em-
ployer interviews the employee concerning an alleged violation of a
company rule. Traditionally, employees have attended this inter-
view alone. Some are now seeking representation even though the
employer has taken no adverse action upon which a grievance might
be based and even though the collective bargaining contract does
not authorize such a right to representation.
Employers are reluctant to allow pre-grievance representation,'
and the employee may be left with the choice of either responding to
incriminating questions or statements, or remaining silent. If the
employee remains silent, the employer may seek to discipline him for
insubordination. If the employee answers, he may provide evidence
upon which to base discipline for the infraction of the employer's
policy that gave rise to the interview. In either case, the employee
may file an unfair labor practice charge or seek to grieve the disci-
pline because of the refusal to allow representation. Before consider-
ing some of the decisions bearing on the question of representation
that have been rendered by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or Board), by the courts reviewing the NLRB, by arbi-
trators, and by the participants in collective bargaining, it will be
necessary to explore in greater detail the character of the problem.
The seemingly simple question of representation at the inves-
tigatory interview has a number of complex aspects. One of these is
the relationship of the investigatory interview to the grievance
mechanism. The vast majority of labor contracts involve a multi-
step grievance procedure culminating in some form of arbitration. 4
The contract will usually have a general definition of a grievance,
which definition usually relates to some action already taken by the
employer. The focus in a grievance is on an aggrieved employee, one
ployer, 79 Lab. Rel. Rep. Anal. 25 (Feb. 14, 1972); Right of Employee to Representation by
Union at Investigative Interview, 80 Lab, Rd. Rep. Anal. 61 (Aug. 14, 1972); Right of
Employee to Union Representation at Meeting Called by Employer, 83 Lab. Rd. Rep. Anal.
49 (July 30, 1973).
2 South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 59 BNA Lab. Arb. 134, 136 (1972) (Seward, Arbitrator).
' See, e.g., Quality Mfg. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972), enforce-
ment denied, — F.2d —, 83 L.R.R.M. 2817 (4th Cir. 1973); Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B.
No. 144, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972), enforcement denied, — F.2d —, 83 L.R.R.M. 2823 (7th
Cir. 1973); Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296
(1967), enforcement denied, 408 F.2d 142, 70 L.R.R.M. 3045 (5th Cir. 1969).
4 A. Cox & D. Bok, Cases and Materials on Labor Law 504 (7th ed. 1969).
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to whom something has happened for which he now seeks relief. If
the employee has been discharged, he may seek reinstatement, and
if he has received a lesser discipline he will seek other appropriate
relief. The aggrieved employee is usually entitled to union represen-
tation to challenge the employer's action. At the time of the inves-
tigatory interview, however, the employer has done nothing to the
employee except call him into the interview. Yet, the employee is
probably well aware of the subject of the interview, and he is
unlikely to feel that the grievance/pre-grievance distinction is impor-
tant. From the employee's point , of view, it is easy to see that
whatever representation rights accrue during the grievance process
should also accrue in the intimately connected preliminary inter-
view. The union itself may also equate the two. On the other hand,
the fact that no discipline has been imposed may lead the employer
to argue that no grievance has arisen and hence no grievance rep-
resentation rights accrue. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider
whether the grievance can be entirely separated from the investiga-
tion that precedes it. In doing so, it is useful to assess the character
of the grievance process. One question to be explored is whether the
grievance process is analogous to the criminal law and punishment,
or perhaps to administrative law and its sanctions. If it is analogous
to areas of law which do not separate preliminary investigations
from subsequent activities, that analogy might help to resolve the
union representation question.
Another aspect of the question of representation at the inves-
tigatory interview is the employee's statutory right to present griev-
ances individually to the employer. 5 The employee may have certain
rights under the contract and certain individual rights under the
National Labor Relations Act6
 (NLRA). If the employee may pre-
sent his own case under the statute, can he invoke the aid of another
party, not necessarily the union, in presenting his grievance? If he
has this statutory right, does it carry over to the investigatory
interview?
Another matter for consideration, in a general fashion, is the
role of union representation in its practical, operative sense. What
are the advantages and disadvantages of an increased scope of union
representation? At some point, the employer's interest in discipline
and production must be weighed against the grant of personal rights
to the employee.
This article will first address itself to these three considerations:
(1) the nature of the investigatory interview; (2) the nature of the
statutory rights of the individual in relation to the employer; and (3)
S See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970),
6 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1970).
3
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the impact of increased representation on the employer's respon-
sibilities. After discussing these topics, the article will review the
decisions of the NLRB, the content of a sample of contracts, and a
sample of the arbitration decisions relating to the question of rep-
resentation at the investigatory interview, in an effort to analyze the
contexts in which employees have sought, successfully or not, rep-
resentation at an investigatory interview. Finally, the article will
undertake to present an overview of all three contexts and to suggest
some guidelines to assist in analyzing the problem of increased
representation at the investigatory interview on a case by case basis.
II. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE EMPLOYER,
THE EMPLOYEE, AND THE LAW IN THE
INVESTIGATORY INTERVIEW
A. The Nature of the Investigatory Interview
The investigatory interview involves several facets. For the
purposes of this article, four aspects will be briefly considered: the
interview process itself; the type of individual being interviewed; the
purpose of the interview; and the incident giving rise to the inter-
view.
The most common form of interview is the informal discussion
between the supervisor and the employee on the shop floor, while a
more formal interview may involve calling the employee to a man-
agement office.? Other variations are possible. An investigation in-
volving security agents may have preceded the interview and pro-
duced evidences The employee may be given a prepared statement
to sign that incriminates him in some degree. 9
 The interview may be
conducted by a trained private detective, who may also suggest the
use of a polygraph machine."
The individuals being interviewed vary. Some may be fully
capable of effective response during the investigatory interview. The
employee may also be an elected union official, who may receive
special treatment because of his status as a union representative."
7
 A series of restrictions has been developed where management interviews employees
concerning union activities and membership relating to the initial organization of a plant. See
generally C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 90-110 (1971). It must be assumed here that
the interview does not delve into these forbidden areas.
See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 192 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 78 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1971).
9
 See, e.g., Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M.
1296 ((967). "[M]any workers experience considerable difficulty when they are requested to
state their views [on a grievance] in writing." B. Crane & R. Hoffman, Successful Handling of
Labor Grievances 65 (1956). It is remarkable to think that they can do better when asked to
sign a statement under these conditions.
" Lafayette Radio Electronics, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693 (1971).
" S. Slichter, J. Healy, & E. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
4
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At the other extreme, the employee may be someone who "had
something less than a fourth grade education, could read English
very little, spoke Spanish at home, and testified . . through an
interpreter."' 2
The purposes of the interview may also vary. The interviewer
may not have a complete understanding of the nature of the alleged
incident and may be seeking heretofore unknown information. The
interviewer may already have a very clear picture of guilt and may
be using the interview to confirm already known facts." The inter-
viewer may have complete knowledge of the employee's guilt, but
may be using the interview to gain information about other activities
violating plant disciplinary rules. 14
Finally, a variety of incidents may give rise to the interview. A
potential disciplinary action for incompetence or for various types of
misconduct may be involved." Some companies may not allow an
immediate discharge regardless of the offense, and the confrontation
may only involve suspending the employee pending a subsequent
investigation. 16 The more serious the incident, the greater the
employee's apprehension, and the more likely the request for rep-
resentation.
From various combinations of the character of the interroga-
tion, the character of the person conducting the interview, the
character of the person being interviewed, and the cause of the
interview, one can describe cases in which representation would be
highly desirable and others in which representation would be less
useful. For example, to the extent that guilt has already been estab-
lished, the employee is not verbally skilled, and the interviewer is a
skilled interrogator, it would seem that the right to representation
might properly be analogized to a similar right associated with the
criminal law.
However, there is a continuing debate as to whether grievance
processes should be analogized to other, more judicialized processes.
Some would deny that any such analogy is proper, even in the case
of a discharge, since in such a case the employee is not being
punished; the employer is merely ending the contractual employ-
ment relationship because he is not getting what he bargained for.' 7
Management 660 t1960) [hereinafter cited as S. Slichterj. See also Union Reps: The Right to
Challenge, CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 58,586, at 84,258 (1970).
12 Texaco, Inc,, 168 N.L.R.B. at 361, 66 L. R.R.M. at 1296.
13 Id.
'a See, e.g., Lafayette, 194 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693 (1971).
15 0. Phelps, Discipline and Discharge in the Unionized Firm 60 n.16 (1959).
16 S. Slichter, supra note 11, at 647,
17 Ross, Discussion, in Labor Arbitration—Perspectives and Problems: Proceedings of
the Seventeenth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 144, 147 (M. Kahn ed.
19641. The same commentator had earlier said: "flit is apparent that the discharge case most
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Yet, discharge is the extreme case in management discipline because
it constitutes the end of an employee's service and destroys his
accumulated seniority. 1 ° If an analogy can be drawn from the judi-
cial models to be applied to the grievance process, the clearest
analogy would appear to involve discharge, and the analogy be-
comes weaker as the discipline imposed becomes less serious. Many
would argue that the analogy is there.
[T]he worker has come to have what might be called a
property right in his job. . . Like any other property right
in our free democratic society, he cannot and should not be
deprived of his rights except by due process. 19
In this context, an appropriate analogy might be drawn be-
tween the discipline-grievance process and the process encountered
in an administrative hearing. 20 In this regard, the Administrative
Procedure Act provides in part: "A person compelled to appear in
person before an agency . . . is entitled to be accompanied, rep-
resented, and advised by counsel or . . . by other qualified
representative." 21
 The Administrative Conference has argued that
this language should be interpreted as meaning that persons com-
pelled to appear or volunteering to appear at an investigation should
have counsel present during the investigation. Counsel could advise
during the investigation, and could make a brief argument on the
record. 22
 This is not yet the established procedure in all federal
agencies.
The Supreme Court has been increasingly active in the adminis-
trative law area in providing new rights for the individuals in-
volved. Its decisions primarily involve the constitutional right to a
hearing before certain actions are taken, for example, replevin. 23
While no argument based on the Constitution is being raised in the
labor relations investigatory context, what is relevant is the Supreme
Court's tangential concern with the lack of representation for the
frequently becomes a review of the reasonableness of management's action rather than a trial
of guilt or innocence." Ross, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: What Happens After
Reinstatement, in Critical Issues in Labor Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual
Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 21, 43 (J. McKelvey ed. 1957).
" 0. Phelps, supra note l5, at 44.
19
 Braden, Scope and Role of the American Arbitration Association, in The Grievance
Process, Proceedings of A Conference 27 (Mich. State Univ., March 23-24, 1956).
29
 Ziskind, Discussion, in Arbitration and Public Policy: Proceedings of the Fourteenth
Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 91, 95 (S. Pollard ed. 1961): "The rules
laid down by courts, particularly in defining a fair hearing by an administrative agency, are
germane to arbitration, and should be accepted by arbitrators."
21
 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970).
22
 W. Gellhorn & C. Byse, Administrative Law Cases and Comments 472-75 (5th ed.
1970).
23
 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
6
UNION REPRESENTATION
individual involved. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 24 the Supreme Court
noted that "if an applicant for the [replevin] writ knows that he is
dealing with an uneducated, uninformed consumer with little access
to legal help and little familiarity with legal procedures . . the
applicant may feel that he can act with impunity." 25 In Goldberg v.
Kelly, 26 the Supreme Court required a pre-termination hearing for
welfare recipients. On the representation point, the Court did not
require that representation be provided at the pre-termination hear-
ing, but it did state that the welfare recipient must be allowed to
retain counsel if he wished. 27 While a rule of law may not yet be
specifically identifiable, a trend toward increased representation can
be identified. If the analogy to administrative law is appropriate, it
can be argued that the right of representation should be involved at
the investigatory stage in labor relations.
Another analogy that is commonly cited in grievance matters,
particularly in discharge cases, is that of the criminal law. Some-
times the analogy is made directly; 28 at other times, the reference is
more indirect, involving the use of the language of the criminal
law. 29 At least one eminent authority sees many parallels between
industrial punishment and the criminal law; "[T]he criminal law and
the process of disciplining employees for unsatisfactory conduct are
peas from the same pod; ... as a consequence each system gives rise
to fundamental issues which are essentially similar . . . ."30
If there is validity in the analogy, the criminal law cases would
also be a precedent for providing representation at the interrogation
stage. Escobedo v. Illinois 31 is perhaps the leading case to this
effect. The Supreme Court said that the exclusionary rule of evi-
dence would be applied to statements made
where . .. the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particu-
lar suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody,
the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, [and] the suspect
24 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
25 Id. at 83 n.13.
23
 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
27 Id. at 270.
23 0. Phelps, supra note 15, at 21: "To meet the test of due process, discipline must be
administered correctly. Administrative standards are drawn in the main from the rules of
criminal procedure."
29 J. Kuhn, Bargaining in Grievance Settlement 22 (1961): "In important cases such as
appealing from 'capital' sentences—for example, a discharge . 	 ."
" Kadish, The Criminal Law and Industrial Discipline as Sanctioning Systems: Some
Comparative Observations, in Labor Arbitration—Perspectives and Problems: Proceedings of
the Seventeenth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 125 (M. Kahn ed. 1964).
' I 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult
with his lawyer . .	 . 32
One of the important aspects of the Escobedo opinion is the above
listing of the specific conditions which the Court considered neces-
sary to give rise to the requirement of counsel. Though Escobedo
involved a felony, the right to counsel at trial has recently been
expanded to apply to other offenses."
However, despite the expanding character of the right to rep-
resentation in the criminal area, the NLRB has rejected the criminal
law analogy. In Lafayette Radio Electronics 34 the Board adopted
the Administrative Law Judge's opinion which contrasted the con-
stitutional right of counsel in Escobedo to what the Administrative
Law Judge considered to be a contractual right. The opinion, how-
ever, did not go into any depth in analyzing the problem, nor did it
attempt to distinguish betWeen the various factors that can be in-
volved in an interrogation.
While no one analogy adequately fits the discipline-grievance
model, it is not so far removed from other areas of the law as to
render comparisons meaningless, and a trend in some of these other
areas can be identified as favoring representation. The discipline-
grievance model can be sought to be distinguished from areas of the
law in which representation is required by showing the obvious
availability of union representation at the discipline-grieVance hear-
ing and by separating the investigation stage from the hearing stage.
This, however, invites closer scrutiny of the question of whether the
particular investigation in a given case was really separate. The
inquiry is of practical significance, for if the investigatory interview
is a part of the grievance process, then the rules of representation of
the grievance process would apply. If it is not a part of the grievance
process, presumably one can argue that different rules would apply.
The NLRB has determined, as will be demonstrated, 35 that the
investigatory process is not part of the grievance process, but is
apparently pre-grievance.
Others have not found the definition of a grievance so clear that
it is easy to distinguish between grievance and pm-grievance situa-
tions. It can be argued that the definition of a grievance is found in
the contract, but it is relatively common for the bargaining agree-
Id. at 490-91.
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972): "We hold, therefore, that absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."
" 194 N.L.R,13. No. 77, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693, 1696 (1971).
35 See note 105 infra.
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ment not to specifically delineate the meaning of the term
"grievance."36 One school of thought feels that "any dispute or
difference which does not involve the interpretation, application, or
meaning of the contract and its performance or nonperformance is
not a grievance." 37 Another school feels that "there should be no
restrictions or limitations which bar prompt detection and early
adjustment of employee discontent." 38 Some would argue that a
grievance does not arise until the complaint is reduced to writing, 39
although others would not be so formalistic. 40 These varying
definitions of a grievance raise a degree of controversy over the
possible existence within the collective bargaining relationship of a
valid distinction between grievances and other types of disputes. 41
One court suggested this distinction:
[lit is plain that collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of
employment which will fix for the future the rules of the
employment for everyone in the unit, is distinguished from
"grievances," which are usually the claims of individuals or
small groups . . . . These claims may involve no question
of the meaning and scope of the bargain, but only some
question of fact or conduct peculiar to the employee . .. . 42
The broader the definition of a grievance becomes, the easier it is to
include the request for representation within the grievance process.
If it is part of the grievance definition, then representation becomes
more easily available.
In summary, the investigatory interview can encompass many
elements. The use of analogies to other areas of law may serve to
indicate the existence of a trend to expand representation beyond
traditional boundaries. The characterization of the interview as a
pre-grievance situation without representation may be begging the
question, since neither contractual terms nor commentators on labor
relations provide a clear starting point for determining when the
preliminary activity ends and the grievance begins.
36
 B. Crane Sr R. Hoffman, Successful Handling of Labor Grievances 14 (1956).
Id. at 6.
39 Id, at 8.
39
 Rogers, Panel Discussion, Basic Problems in Grievance Processing, in The Grievance
Process, Proceedings of A Conference 42 (Mich. State Univ., March 23-24, 1956).
4(
 Bannon, Panel Discussion, Grievance Procedure and the Plant Setting, in The Grie-
vance Process, Proceedings of A Conference 21 (Mich. State Univ., March 23-24, 1956).
4 ' Sherman, The Individual and His Grievance—Whose Grievance Is It?, I t U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 35, 37 (1949).
'2
 Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 I 2.2d 69, 72-73, 15 L.R.R.M. 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1945)
(citations omitted).
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B. The Individual and the Employer
While the question of representation should be viewed in light
of the entire grievance mechanism, it should also be viewed in light
of a specific statutory provision. Section 9(a) of the NLRA states in
part:
[A]ny individual employee or a group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long
as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment. 43
The significance of section 9(a) in the context of the investigatory
interview is difficult to divine. The legislative history is not particu-
larly helpful, 44 nor are industrial contracts helpful, because most
contracts do not consider the rights of the employee under the Act. 45
Thus the usual guides to statutory construction are lacking in this
situation.
The question is thus presented whether an individual exercising
a section 9(a) right to present an individual grievance is entitled to
bring a friend (representative) along to help him present the griev-
ance. In an early case, one court said: "We think an inexperienced
or ignorant griever can ask a more experienced friend to assist him,
but he cannot present his grievance through any union except the
representative."46 The usual objection to using a "friend" is the
possibility of conflict with the union certified under the NLRA as the
"exclusive"47 representative.
Whatever may be the individual rights under section 9(a) to
present grievances, the problem of his having the assistance of
another person is not clear enough to warrant a firm conclusion. The
limited precedent and commentary seem to indicate that assistance
is proper so long as the assistant is free from any taint of association
with a rival union. 48 Thus it would seem that an employee would be
entitled to hire a lawyer or to use another employee to help him
43
 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) (emphasis in the original).
" Cox, Rights Under A Labor. Agreement, 69 Harv, L. Rev. 601, 624-25 n.5I (1956).
43 Sherman, supra note 41, at 50.
46
 147 F.Zd at 73, 15 L.R.R.M. at 856. "The legislative history of the original 1935 Act
[NLRA] shows clearly that the earlier proviso was not intended to permit the defeated or
minority union any rights to represent employees." Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
649, 651, 33 L.R.R.M. 1203 (1953).
47
 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
46 Annot., 9 A.L.R.2d 696 (1950).
10
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present his grievance, although it would be difficult to cite much
judicial precedent for the point. One must then also ask, if the
employee can use a friend for presentation of a 9(a) grievance, why
cannot his union representative also be his friend? The answer is not
apparent. If assistance is available to present a grievance, and if a
grievance/pre-grievance distinction is not valid, section 9(a) might
provide the basis for arguing that the employee's right to representa-
tion at the interview could be based on the statute. This approach is
not one which has been explored in any depth.
If the employee can present his own grievance, one must also
consider whether the section 9(a) grievance is limited by the contract
definition of a grievance. 49 By the wording of section 9(a), the only
limitation is that the adjustment of the grievance not be inconsistent
with the contract. Presumably the statutory grievance could go
beyond the contract, and if so, the employee could raise as a griev-
ance the lack of representation at the interview, and rely on what
precedent there is for maintaining that he is entitled to present this
grievance with the help of a friend. Thus either the interview is
converted into a grievance hearing or the employer runs the risk of
denying the employee his statutory protection. While the circularity
of the reasoning of this argument is apparent, 5° it serves to em-
phasize the important role of section 9(a) individual rights in answer-
ing any question involving a claim of individual right by an em-
ployee.
There is a belief among some management people that lower
level union representatives impede, rather than help, the settlement
of grievances." Thus some would argue that not only is union
presence not needed at the investigatory interview, but also that it is
not desirable at the lower steps in the grievance process itself. From
this point of view, the provision of section 9(a) on individual griev-
ances reflects not an increase in rights so much as a statement of a
desired end, and the best relationship is the employer-employee
relationship, with minimum union involvement. Under this in-
terpretation, section 9(a) is not an extension of rights, but rather a
preservation of rights as they existed prior to the collective bargain-
ing agreement. This view, however, tends to ignore what little
precedent there is on the question. 52
In summary, it is arguable that the individual's right to appear
before the employer with the assistance of another is not limited to
the terms of the contract and is not limited to the unfair labor
49 Annot., 158 A.L.R. 1174 (1945).
5° See note 201 infra.
51 B. Crane & R. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 42.
52 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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practice sections of the legislation. There is, however, little prece-
dent upon which to base a decision in this area, but what precedent
there is suggests that the employee, in a grievance situation, can
appear with a properly selected assistant. 53
C. Employer Responsibility and Representation
It is clear that not every communication between the employer
and the employee has to be made in the presence of a
representative, 54 even if the right to representation is expanded. The
investigatory interview has given rise to most of the cases, but there
are other situations in which the unrepresented employee will be
confronted by the employer. An employee may properly refuse a job
assignment if the working conditions present an unreasonable safety
hazard, 55
 and an explanation of why the employee refused to work
may be required. If the employee takes a leave of absence, the
employer may require that the employee sign a statement which will
preclude him from accepting other outside employment. 56 When an
employee is absent from work and alleges illness as the excuse, he
may be required to prove that there was in fact an illness. 57 Refusal
to respond or to respond adequately in these types of cases may
result in discipline or discharge for insubordination or for violation
of some more explicit policy. Just as in the case of the investigatory
interview, it might seem reasonable to the employee to ask for union
representation in one of these situations, although the cases have not
yet presented these problems.
It should also be noted that in other situations, primarily those
involving recognition and election campaigns, the employer may be
precluded from talking to the employee about certain matters, or
from questioning him on certain subjects. Interrogation as to union
sympathy and affiliation has been held to violate the NLRA. 58 In
this context, the NLRB has evaluated "interrogation in the light of
all the surrounding circumstances, including the time, place, per-
sonnel involved, and known position of the employer."59
Thus one can cite employer-employee confrontation situations
other than the investigatory interview where, historically, no express
right of representation is granted, and situations where, depending
53
 Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69, 15 L. R.R.M. 852 (5th Cir. 1945).
54 See text at notes 85-91 infra.
15
 Insubordination: The Safety Exception, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 58,545, at 84,135 (1969).
$6 Cf. Problems Created by Moonlighting, CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 58,563, at 84,190 (1970).
57
 See Management Rights; Proof of Illness, CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 58,554, at 84,163
(1969).
59 See, e.g., NLRB v. West Coast Casket Co., 205 F.2d 902, 32 L.R.R.M. 2353 (9th
Cir. 1953); Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 27 L.R.R.M. 2012 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
59 C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 102 (1971).
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upon specific circumstances, the employer is not permitted to inter-
rogate the employee at all. Hence, it is worthwhile to consider some
of the pragmatic advantages and disadvantages of increased union
representation at the investigatory interview.
1. Advantages of Increased Representation
Plant rules may not be clearly spelled out either in the contract
or in formalized past practices. Despite an occasional attempt to
make rules purporting to cover all possible infractions and to set
forth the penalty for each such violation, the administration of the
plant discipline system is not always automatic." An experienced
union official might be more useful if he is brought into the matter at
an early stage such as the investigatory interview to help explain
and interpret the plant's "common law" which may frequently
temper the written plant rules. Some problems are highly technical
and the union may have, for example, "expert compensation stew-
ards" who need to be consulted at the outset. 6 ' Some problems
involve group rather than individual grievances. These may tend to
be "highly explosive" and require early union consultation. 62 Thus
there may be times when union intervention can be used to resolve
issues. Obviously the employee often thinks it is to his or her
advantage to have the union representative present, and it may be
advantageous to an employer to defer to this feeling at times. To the
extent that one accepts the analogies from other judicial areas and to
the extent that the problem in question might result in a discharge,
representation would seem more consistent with current judicial
trends in those analogous areas. Many claim that "[t]he overwhelm-
ing preponderance of personnel problems occur at the foreman-
employee level. Face-to-face communication between the employee
and his immediate superior is most effective in terms of employee
response and interest." 63 However, when the employee must face
higher level management interview personnel, few advantages may
be lost by having union representation, since the personal relation-
ship characteristic of lower level contact is already absent. In addi-
tion, the sooner the union is brought into the matter, the sooner it
will be able to complete its own investigation and be able to pro-
ceed, if needed, through the grievance process with a fuller under-
standing of the grievance. The sooner the employer knows the full
story, the sooner he will know the proper course of action. In
6° S. Slichter, J. Healy, & E. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on
Management 640 (1960) [hereinafter cited as S. Slichted
61 J. Kuhn, supra note 29, at 8.
62
 B. Crane & R. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 56.
1',9
	 at 171-72.
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discipline cases, if the matter goes to arbitration, the employer has
the burden of proof." Since this burden is a heavy one, 65 the
employer might benefit from early union representation.
2. Disadvantages of Increased Representation
Among the disadvantages of union representation at an inves-
tigatory interview is the feeling of some employers that the union
simply cannot play a constructive role. Union representation also
means that another employee will have to leave the production line,
and time will be lost. In addition to lost time, some contracts
obligate the employer to pay union members for time spent on union
matters. 66 If the company is small, the "open-door" policy of prob-
lem resolution may be most effective. A formal grievance system in
such small companies would be so much more cumbersome than an
informal, face-to-face procedure that it might well defeat the pur-
pose of the entire system. 67 In addition, the established practice is
for the employer to suspend an employee from work prior to the
imposition of discipline. 68 It might be argued that if an employee is
given an initial suspension, it will give him the time and opportunity
to defend properly his position without representation, assuming, of
course, that the suspension is not the result of the investigatory
interview. An increasingly used form of discipline today is "progres-
sive discipline whereby sanctions become increasingly severe as of-
fenses are repeated, until correction becomes sufficiently unlikely to
warrant discharge."69 The use of progressive discipline leading to
discharge rather than the more frequent resort to immediate dis-
charge might argue against maximum representation, since lessened
initial sanctions may justify fewer procedural safeguards. Unifor-
mity, it can be argued, might also justify a nonrepresentation rule.
If there is uncertainty as to the right of an individual to present a
grievance and the right of the exclusively certified union to control
grievances, and if this uncertainty leads to undesirable results, 7°
then uncertainty as to when representation is required would also
lead to undesirable results.
Few would argue that every employer-employee contact should
64 S. Slichter, supra note 60, at 656. Myers, Concepts of Industrial Discipline, in
Management Rights and the Arbitration Process: Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting,
National Academy of Arbitrators 59, 65 (J. McKelvey ed. 1956).
" 0. Phelps, Discipline and Discharge in the Unionized Firm 46 (1959): "As a simple
matter of statistics, a discharge appealed to arbitration appears to stand a better than even
change of being reversed in whole or in part."
66 S. Slichter, supra note 60, at 727.
67 0. Phelps, supra note 65, at 6; B. Crane & R. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 75.
" Discipline: Procedural Due Process, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 58,572, at 84,215 (1970).
Kadish, supra note 30, at 139.
" See Cox, supra note 44, at 618.
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require union representation. Thus, a serious disadvantage to be
considered is union infringement on management. Sometimes the
grievance process is used to accomplish what cannot be gained
through bargaining. "[A]rbitration is not merely a means of resolv-
ing disputes, but, on occasion, a means by which unions try to
enlarge their roles in the labor-management partnership."'" On the
other hand, the union may often be reluctant to involve itself too
deeply in the preliminary activities relating to discipline, since the
union can retain greater flexibility in appealing a disciplinary case if
it does not share the responsibility for making plant rules. 72 Early
involvement, giving rise to shared responsibility, may make the
union a more concerned participant. A decision made by the em-
ployee in the preliminary stages based on the union's advice may
subsequently be found to be binding on the employee." On the
other hand, an employee who does not feel sufficiently competent to
represent himself adequately may want the union involved in his
case at its early stages. Thus, while both the union and the employer
may have reasons for wanting the role of the union minimized, the
employee may feel otherwise.
A variety of other advantages and disadvantages could doubt-
less be listed, but the preceding discussion is probably sufficient to
indicate that practical, as well as theoretical, arguments can be
made on both sides of the question. These practical considerations
become increasingly important if the question of pre-grievance rep-
resentation is a matter for collective bargaining rather than a matter
of statutory directive.
III. NLRB DECISIONS
The problem of representation and the investigatory interview
can be dealt with in several different forums, and the decision-
making body in each forum makes a judgment based on somewhat
different factors than those employed by any other forum. The
various forums to be considered here are: (1) the National Labor
Relations Board, which is subject to review by the courts; (2) the
contract; and (3) the arbitrators.
At the NLRB level, before a case can be brought, there must be
71 Murphy, Introduction to M. Stone, Labor Grievances and Decisions, at XX (1965).
"On the other hand, mature labor chiefs are aware of the fact that the usefulness of the
grievance procedure is impaired if it is employed to obtain concessions which cannot be
achieved through collective bargaining." B. Crane & R. Hoffman, supra note 36, at 4.
72 S. Slichter, supra note 60, at 628.
23 Cf. H.H. Robertson Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 637 (1968) (Kabaker, Arbitrator). The em-
ployee was confronted by the employer with certain evidence, and though the union advised
him not to quit, he did quit. The arbitrator found that the employee had voluntarily quit
when the employee sought to grieve the matter as a discharge.
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a decision by the General Counsel to issue a complaint. This deci-
sion by the General Counsel has consistently been held not to be
subject to review by a court. 74 If the General Counsel does issue a
complaint, then the matter will be heard first by the Administrative
Law Judge, who will render a decision and opinion, and then
perhaps by the Board. Board decisions may be rendered by panels
of at least three members, 75 with the result that the changing
make-up of the panels may bring about different decisions on essen-
tially the same factual questions. Finally, the Board's decisions can
be reviewed by the courts. 76
At an earlier time, the General Counsel did not often issue
complaints on the representation issue. In one situation, an em-
ployer refused to go to arbitration when the employees were rep-
resented by a private attorney. No complaint was issued. 77 More
nearly in point, the General Counsel for some time declined to issue
complaints for refusing to recognize a right of representation prior to
the imposition of discipline." Recently, these types of cases have
been among the features of the General Counsel's Report of Case-
Handling Developments, 79 which gives some indication of when a
complaint will issue in a denial of representation case. The recent
flurry of activity at the General Counsel and Board levels 80 indicates
that the earlier reluctance to issue complaints has been overcome.
Notwithstanding the prior reluctance of the General Counsel to
issue a complaint, the NLRB has nevertheless received cases involv-
ing representation problems. When the question is before the Board,
up to three sections of the NLRA may be involved. Section 8(01) 8 '
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with or
restrain the exercise by employees of their right to organize under
section 7; 82 section 8(a)(3) 83 prohibits discrimination by the employer
74 C. Morris, supra note 59, at 822.
75
 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1970).
m 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
77
 Admin. Rulings of NLRB General Counsel, 33 L.R.R.M..1011 (Case No. 834) (Oct.
23, 1953). See also Admin. Rulings of NLRB General Counsel, 33 L.R.R.M. 1527 (Case No.
923) (Apr. 22, 1954).
78
 Admin. Rulings of NLRB General Counsel, 37 L.R.R.M. 1076 (Case No. K-71) (Oct.
10, 1955).
79
 Report of Case Handling Developments at NLRB, 80 Lab. Rel. Rep. 329 (1972);
Case-Handling, Administrative Developments at NLRB, 81 Lab. Rel. Rep. 333 (1972).
81)
 See materials cited in note 79 supra.
81 29 U.S.C, § 158(a)(1) (1970) states: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer—(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7] . . ."
11
 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) states in pertinent part: "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization . . to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection . . . ."
83
 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
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against employees because of their union activity; and section
8(a)(5)84 forbids the employer from refusing to bargain collectively
with the representative of his employees.
In order to analyze the Board's decisions granting or withhold-
ing the right of representation at an investigatory interview, it will
be useful to consider some of the Board and court decisions on the
representation issue. The cases will be broken down into several
classifications, and the cases within each classification will be
considered in rough chronological order. The first group of headings
will deal with several different types of fact situations with which
the Board has been confronted in deciding the representation issue,
and the second group of headings will deal with the various tests
formulated by the Board for determining whether there is a right to
representation in a particular interview. Analysis of the substance of
these decisions will be deferred until all the fact situations have been
presented, so that they may be considered in relation to each other.
The various fact situations will be presented under the headings of
(A) explanatory meetings, and (B) insubordination and the request
for representation. Under the general classification of Board tests
will be the headings of (C) fact-finding, and (D) reasonable employee
fear of adverse consequences.
A. Explanatory Meetings
Whatever else might be involved in the right of representation,
it does not cover every meeting between the employer and the
employees. Explanatory meetings do not give rise to representation
and they should accordingly be distinguished from investigatory
interviews.
In Ingraham Industries 85 the employer held meetings to explain
its profit sharing plans to the employees. The union claimed a
statutory right to be present. The Administrative Law Judge,
affirmed by the Board panel, found no right to be present where
"[t]he meeting was to disseminate information . . . concerning a „
plan which had been negotiated by the Company . . . without any
attempt to modify or renegotiate the plan, the details of which must
have been well known to the union representatives . . . . n86 He
analogized the meeting to meetings devoted to the explanation of
health insurance plans and to meetings concerning individual per-
"by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . ."
84 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees . 	 .
" 178 N.L.R.B. 558, 72 L.R.R.M. 1245 (1969).
" Id. at 562, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1246.
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sonal problems, at which meetings the union was not usually
present. 87
In Wald Manufacturing Co." the Board panel adopted the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, who dismissed a charge
involving a lack of union representation. During the course of his
opinion, the Administrative Law Judge said:
The Union has a statutory right to be present at the
adjustment of grievances, but to permit it to insist on
attending every routine interview which might culminate
in discipline goes beyond the statute and could disrupt
personnel practices in a large plant. I do not reach here the
question whether if an employee expressed the desire for
union representation at such an interview, the Company
could lawfully refuse it, nor do I reach the case of an
employee called in for some special investigation in a mat-
ter other than a mere failure to meet production, or some
similar common infraction of the rules."
In United States Gypsum Co. 9° the employee was summoned to
the employer's office and handed a misconduct report filed against
him, and the employee was warned about the employer's policy
relating to the incident. No questions were asked and no suggestions
were made concerning the admission or denial of guilt. The Board
panel dismissed the section 8(a)(5) charge on the basis that the
employee was not in a position in which he was forced to defend
himself. Thus there was no need for union representation."
B. Insubordination and the Request for Representation
The employee is required not to be insubordinate toward the
employer. The request for or attempted exercise of the right to
representation must be done in the proper manner. The Board has
indicated that discipline cannot lie for merely requesting representa-
tion, but it can lie for an insubordinate request. 92
In Quality Manufacturing Co. 93
 the Board panel found section
8(a)(1) and possibly 8(a)(3) violations by the employer where the
union representative was disciplined when she sought to be present
27 Id.
22
 176 N.L.R.B. 839, 73 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1969), enforced, 426 F.2d 1328, 74 L.R.R.M.
2375 (6th Cir. 1970).
99
 176 N.L.R.B. at 846, 73 L.R.R.M. at 1488.
9° 200 N.L.R.B. No. 46, 82 L.R.R.M. 1240 (1972).
91 82 L.R.R.M. at 1240.
92
 See, e.g., American Beef Packers, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. No. 131, 80 L.R.R.M. 1165
(1972).
93
 195 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972), enforcement denied, — F.2d —, 83
L.R.R.M. 2817 (4th Cir. 1973).
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at a discipline meeting between an employee and the employer, and
where the employee was disciplined solely for requesting such rep-
resentation. The Board did not find the employee's actions insubor-
dinate, and it distinguished the case from prior cases in which the
Board or courts of appeals had refused to find an unfair labor
practice by the employer on the basis of whether the employer
infringed on the right of the union to bargain collectively by denying
the union's request to represent an employee at an investigatory
interview. 94
In Emerson Electric Co." the Board panel found no violations
of the NLRA. In that case, an employee anticipating discipline
arranged to have two other employees attend the meeting as witnes-
ses. The primary employee was discharged and the two witnesses
were disciplined. The Board panel concluded:
We cannot say, however, that Section 7 creates a right to
insist, to the point of insubordination, upon having fellow
employees as witnesses to a meeting in a private manage-
ment office at which it is expected that some measure of
discipline will be meted out. 96
Similarly, in American Beef Packers, Inc. 97 the employee was
called into a meeting in the presence of a union steward concerning
his job performance. He left the meeting without permission and
returned with two other stewards; thereupon he argued heatedly and
was discharged. The Board panel majority affirmed the Administra-
tive Law Judge's findings of no unfair labor practices, in part
because of the insubordination of the employee in leaving the meet-
ing. The Administrative Law Judge also refused to find a failure of
the proper exercise of the right to union representation because one
steward was present at the interview, and because the employee
could have obtained the representation of the other stewards by
filing a grievance subsequent to the interview. 98
In Napoleon Steel Contractors, Inc. 99 an employee got into an
argument with the foreman about whether he had to work in the
rain. The employee refused to work or to leave until the union
steward came. He was discharged for insubordination and the
Board panel found that no unfair labor practices had been commit-
ted by the employer, who had good reason to believe that the
64
 79 L.R.R.M. at 1270.
95
 185 N.L.R.B. 346, 75 L.R.R.M. 1028 (1970).
66
 Id. at 347, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1029.
67
 196 N.L,R.11. No. 131, 80 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1972).
66
 80 L.R.R.M. at 1166.
" 194 N.L.R.B. No. 134, 79 L.R.R.M. 1184 (1971).
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employee's insubordinate activity disrupted the operations of the
work site. '°°
C. Fact-Finding
The Board's early decisions on the question of union representa-
tion were to the effect that if the employer were merely holding a
fact-finding investigation, representation would be denied, but if the
inquiry went beyond fact-finding, representation would be
permitted. 101 The majority of the decisions denied representation. ' 02
The decisions do not seem to involve any close analysis of the
content and conduct of the interview, although the fact-finding
question would seem to require analysis of what actually happened
at the interview in order to see if it really involved fact-finding.
In Dobbs Houses, Inc."" the Board panel dismissed a com-
plaint stemming from a request by an employee for the presence of a
representative of the certified union during a discharge conversation.
The complaint alleged a section 8(a)(1) violation by the employer.
The Administrative Law Judge indicated that there was no right to
have the union representative present because the employee "was
discharged for cause and the discharge conference was not predi-
cated upon her involvement in any protected uhion activity. 5) 1 04
There was no discussion of the fact that discharge obviously affects
the terms and conditions of employment.
In Chevron Oil Co)" section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) complaints
were dropped in a case involving the interrogation of nine employees
to determine if disciplinary action should be imposed upon them
without acceding to their request that a union representative be
present during the interrogation. Company policy in discipline cases
was to determine if a prima facie case existed, and if so, to hold a
fact-finding session with the employee. The employee was advised
that he need not tell his side, but if he did not, the prima facie case
would be assumed to be true. Because of the fact-finding character
of the interview, union representatives were not allowed to be
present, although the union and employees were allowed to be
present at the subsequent disciplinary meeting at which the facts
were reviewed, all were allowed to speak, and in appropriate cases,
discipline was meted out. In dismissing the complaint, the Adminis-
1 °° 79 L.R.R.M. at 1184.
1 °' See, e.g., Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 68 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1968);
Chevron Oil Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 574, 66 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1967); Texaco, Inc., Houston
Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967).
1 ° 2 See text at notes 103-27 infra.
' 113 145 N.L.R.B. 1565, 55 L.R.R.M. 1218 (1964).
1 °4
 Id. at 1571.
1 ° 5
 168 N.L.R.B. 574, 66 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1967).
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trative Law Judge's opinion, which the Board subsequently
adopted, reasoned that:
But this is not to say that [under sections 9(a) and 8(a)(5)] a
bargaining agent must be privy to management councils,
or that represented employees must be shielded by that
agent from company inquiries, on each and every occasion
when management embarks upon an investigation to ascer-
tain whether plant discipline has been breached.'" . .
Respondent was under no statutory or contractual duty to
conduct preliminary factfinding meetings with the em-
ployees prior to the imposition of discipline for the infrac-
tion of plant rules. . . This was . . . patently designed to
avoid the possible invocation of the time-consuming griev-
ance procedures . . . . 107
Similarly, in Jacobe-Pearson Ford, Inc. 108 a complaint was
dismissed when an employee was refused union representation at a
meeting with his employer concerning his job performance. The
Board panel indicated that no decision had been reached as to
discipline, that the employer was still investigating, and it would
inform the union of any decision and pursue the matter further at
the bargaining table. "The 'potential' for disciplinary action was
remote and the purpose of the meeting essentially for the gathering
of information." 1 °9
A similar rationale was used in Texaco, Inc., Houston Produc-
ing Division v. NLRB.'" There a member of the bargaining unit,
but not of the union, was disciplined for taking home company
kerosene. The individual had had, very little education, was only
marginally literate, and communicated through an interpreter."'
He requested union representation, and it was denied; but he chose
to stay when he was told he could leave if he desired; and he signed
a company-prepared statement concerning the incident. The Ad-
ministrative Law Judge dismissed section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) charges,
but the Board panel found that those provisions had been violated:
[The] meeting was not simply part of an investigation into
some alleged theft and the employee] was not invited to
attend solely to provide the company's representatives with
1 °6
 Id. at 578,
197 Id. at 579.
i" 172 N.L.R.B. 594, 68 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1968).
I" Id. at 595, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1306.
II° 408 F.2d 142, 70 L. R. R. M. 3045 (5th Cir. 1969), denying enforcement to 168
N.L.R.B, 361, 66 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1967).
"I 168 N.L.R.B. at 361, 66 L.R.R.M. at 1296.
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information. . . [T]he Company sought to deal directly
with [the employee] concerning matters affecting his term
and conditions of employment. 12
The Fifth Circuit reversed, however, on the basis that the
interview's purpose was merely to ascertain facts from the employee
rather than to bargain with him." 3
In Dayton Typographic Service, Inc. "4 the Board panel con-
curred in the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of section 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) charges when the employer refused union representation
to an employee at a quality control meeting. The Administrative
Law Judge summarized the Board's earlier decisions:
The Board has recognized that the Act does not re-
quire that a labor organization must be privy to manage-
ment conferences and investigations concerning its business
operations, even where they involve discussions with em-
ployees, or that such employees when represented by a
union must be shielded by that agent from employer in-
quiries every time the employer starts an investigation to
determine what is wrong with its operation or whether
plant rules, practices, or disciplines have been breached.
. . . It is only where an employee is called into a discussion
with management on a problem involving his performance,
which has gone beyond the factfinding or investigation
state to a point where management has decided that dis-
cipline of that specific employee is appropriate, that the
employer is required on demand of either the employee or
his bargaining agent to permit that agent to be present.'"
In another representation case involving Texaco, Texaco, Inc.
(Teamsters Local 692), 116 the Board panel affirmed the Administra-
tive Law Judge's dismissal of a complaint involving section 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(5) charges for denial of representation in an interview
session with an employee. The Board panel did not affirm all of the
Administrative Law Judge's discussion, however, which raised five
important considerations in a criticism of the Board's criteria for
deciding when representation at an interview is or is not required:
(1) The Board's dichotomy between fact-finding conferences and
record-building disciplinary conferences does not recognize the mul-
113 Id. at 362, 66 L,R.R.M. at 1297.
113 408 F, 2d at 144, 70 L.R.R.M, at 3046.
114 176 N.L.R.B. 357, 72 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1969).
115 Id. at 361 (citations omitted). Note was taken of the Fifth Circuit's decision not to
enforce the Board's order in the Texaco case. Id. at 364 n.22.
116 179 N.L.R.B. 976, 72 L.R.R.M. 1596 (1969).
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tifarious facets of industrial life; (2) The Board's view of manage-
ment conduct as embodying a three-step process involving
fact-finding, discipline decision making, and a determination as to
the degree of discipline to be imposed is unrealistic because it might
occur in one meeting or be the responsibility of a single person; (3)
The Board's past decisions give little real guidance to employers and
employees as to how to conduct themselves; (4) The Board's deci-
sions do not define the degree of prospective punishment which
generates the statutory right; and (5) The Board's cases do not
distinguish adequately between fact-finding questions and accusa-
tory questions in an interview."'
In Illinois Bell Telephone Co." 8 employer security agents inter-
rogated the employee concerning an alleged theft of money. The
interrogator wrote out a statement for the employee to sign and
denied the employee's request for union representation. Later the
employee was discharged. The Administrative Law Judge, affirmed
by the Board panel, found no violation, saying in part:
. .. [T]hey were merely interrogating him concerning
his activities for the purpose of gathering information to be
turned over to the line supervisor . . . i.e., the management
officials who did have authority to effect disciplinary ac-
tion. . . . Moreover, after such [discipline] decision was
made . . . a meeting among all interested parties, including
the union representatives, was held the next day where the
subject was for the purpose of dealing with [the employee]
respecting terms and conditions of his employment
—specifically what form of disciplinary action was
to be imposed. 19
In Lafayette Radio Electronics Corp. 120 the union. rather than
an individual employee, requested that a steward be present when
the employer interrogated employees about the alleged theft of mer-
chandise. The employer refused the request. Interrogation included,
in some' instances, voluntary signing of statements and possible use
of a lie detector. The Board panel approved the Administrative Law
Judge's decision that no violation had occurred. Reliance was placed
on the Board's earlier distinction between fact-finding (no union
presence required) and discipline (union presence required). The
argument was carried one step further, however, when the Adminis-
trative Law Judge contended that an employee interview might still
117 Id. at 982-83.
116 192 N.L.R.13, No. 138, 78 L.R.R.M. 1109 (1971).
" 9
 78 L.R.R.M. at 1110 (emphasis in the original).
IN 194 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693 (1971).
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have an investigatory purpose, notwithstanding the fact that the
employee's guilt has been established, since the employer might be
investigating factors other than the employee's guilt. 12 ' In the
Lafayette case, in which several employees had been subjected to
interviews by the employer, discharge always followed a finding of
guilt, and although guilt was already found, the purpose of interro-
gation was still investigatory, namely, to recover stolen merchan-
dise.
What makes the Lafayette opinion particularly interesting is the
Administrative Law Judge's rejection of the obvious analogy to right
to counsel in the criminal area, as developed in such cases as
Escobedo v. Illinois. 122 To this end, the Administrative Law Judge
reasoned:
Escobedo rests on a constitutional guarantee of the
right to counsel. Although the General Counsel is here
asserting the existence of a statutory right, in reality the
right which he seeks to protect is a contract right, namely,
the asserted nullification of the grievance and arbitration
provisions of the contract. . . . In this case, Respondent
had not repudiated any of its contractual obligations.' 23
In one case, United Aircraft Corp., "4 the Board looked at the
character of the interrogation and found coercive interrogation to be
an unfair labor practice by the employer, independent from the
refusal to allow representation. The Board panel found, among
other things, that in the employer's investigation of union activities,
"the investigators behaved toward the employees being interviewed
in an overbearing and intimidating manner, and infringed] on their
statutory rights by coercive interrogation." 125 The Administrative
Law Judge also found that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5)
by refusing to provide representation upon request by interrogated
employees when in fact the employees were subsequently
disciplined. 126 However, the Board dismissed the 8(a)(5) complaint
because the majority status of the union was in doubt. 127
121 78 L.R.R.M. at 1695.
122
 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
123
 78 L.R.R.M. at 1696.
124
 179 N.L.R.B. 935, 72 L.R.R.M. 1555 (1969).
125 Id. at 937, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1558.
126
 Id., 72 L.R.R.M. at 1559.
122
 Id. at 938, 72 L.R.R.M. at 1559. The court of appeals affirmed the Board's dismissal
of the § 8(a)(5) complaint, stating: "Similarly, we think that the company's refusal to call
stewards, which occurred before the dues checkoff cards established a majority at any of these
plants, was not a violation of section 8(a)(5)." United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85,
98, 76 L.R.R.M. 2761, 2772 (2d Cir. 1971).
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D. Reasonable Employee Fear of Adverse Consequences
At a time when the fact-finding criteria for determining the
right to representation seemed well established, one Board panel
seemed to switch tests. In a series of cases, with dissenting opinions,
a panel majority began to decide that representation was appro-
priate at an investigatory interview where the employee reasonably
feared adverse consequences. The dissenting Board members argued
that the question was solely a matter of what the collective bargain-
ing agreement said. Notwithstanding this new test, the majority of
the cases deny representation. The Board panel in Quality Manufac-
turing Co. 128 said that it was not only an unfair labor practice to
discipline the employee for demanding representation, but also that
it would be a violation to discipline the employee if he or she refused
to go through the interview without union representation because of
fear of adverse consequences. The Board's decision did, however,
except from this rule routine conversations such as instructions by
the employer or corrections of work techniques. 129
Member Kennedy dissented from the decision on the ground
that the new test gave the employee the sole right to decide the
nature of the interview and transformed the state of mind of the
employee into the determinative factor as to whether the employer
must permit union representation at the interview. He argued that
this would in effect make the employer's motive for conducting the
interview irrelevant.' 30 His opinion interpreted the majority as say-
ing that a purely investigatory interview would still be permitted,
but only if the employee, not reasonably fearing for his employment,
either voluntarily attends the meeting or is allowed to bring a union
representative. The dissent argued that by focusing on the
employee's subjective intent, rather than applying an objective test,
the Board had overturned the prior Board rule on intent.' 31 The
dissent also noted the earlier Lafayette decision' 32
 rejecting the
argument of a right to representation based on the criminal law
analogy of a constitutional right to counsel under Escobedo: "[T]he
right to union representation during an interview with the employer
128 195 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 79 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1972), enforcement denied, — F, 2d —, 83
L.R.R.M. 2817 (4th Cir. 1973).
1 " 79 L.R.R.M. at 1271.
136
 Id. at 1272 (dissenting opinion), The majority replied to this argument that:
Here also, our dissenting colleague asserts that we will be compelled to resort to
purely subjective considerations in judging employer conduct. We disagree. Whether
discipline was imposed for cause, or for discriminatory reasons, is a factual matter
with which we regularly deal in cases of 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations.
Id. at 1271 n.4.
' 31
 Id, at 1273 (dissenting opinion).
132
 194 N.L.R.B. No. 77, 78 L.R.R.M. 1693 (1971),
25
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
must . . . be based on contract. It should be the subject of the
collective-bargaining process like any other term or condition of
employment." 133 The majority in Quality Manufacturing would ap-
parently find the right to representation or rejection of the interview
in section 7 as enforced by section 8(01). 134
In Service Technology Corp.'" a dispute between several em-
ployees led to their being summoned to the employer's office. Each
employee requested and was refused union representation and each
refused to give information. Discipline resulted and the Board panel
found no violation. As for the threat to fire the employees for not
participating in the interview, "it was no more than a heated state-
ment, not designed to interfere with the employees' rights to rep-
resentation in general, but rather to enforce the exclusion of the
union steward] himself, which we find not an unlawful
objective." 36 The peculiar circumstance of the case was that the
union steward was also involved in the physical threats to other
employees which was presumably the basis of the discipline.
In Mobil Oil Corp.'" interviews concerning the removal of
company property were held without union representation by a
security_ agent who did not have the authority to discipline. The
interviews were based on the results of earlier security surveillance.
At the termination of the interview, each employee was suspended
pending further investigation. The Board panel found that discipline
of employees who requested representation at the interviews vio-
lated section 8(a)(1). 138 The Board panel found those employees had
had reason to fear that the employer suspected them of stealing
company property, and that they might be discharged. 139 The
Board panel said in part:
Such a dilution of the employee's right to act collectively to
protect his job interests is . . . unwarranted interference
with his right to insist on concerted protection, rather than
individual self-protection, against possible adverse em-
ployer action. The employer may, if it wishes, advise the
employee that it will not proceed with the interview unless
133
 79 L.R.R.M. at 1274 (dissenting opinion).
1 " In both footnotes 6 and 8 of its opinion, the majority said: "We deem it unnecessary
to determine whether the discharge also violated Sec. 8(a)(3), as such additional finding would
not affect our remedial order." 79 L.R.R.M. at 1271 n.6, 1272 n.8.
135 196 N.L.R.B. No. 121, 80 L.R.R.M. 1187 (1972).
136 80 L.R.R.M. at 1188.
137 196 N.L.R.B. No. 144, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972), enforcement denied, — F.2d —,
83 L.R.R.M. 2823 (7th Cir. 1973).
138 Discipline of employees not requesting union representation prior to or during their
interviews did not violate 	 8(a)(1). 80 L.R.R.M. at 1191 n.2.
139 Id. at 1191.
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the employee is willing to enter the interview unaccom-
panied by his representative. 140
As he did in Quality Manufacturing,"' Member Kennedy dis-
sented, but on a somewhat different point:
My colleagues are here holding, in effect, that only when
the General Counsel establishes that an employee has en-
gaged in misconduct of sufficient gravity to cause him to
believe that his job may be affected thereby, or after he
somehow concludes that he is under suspicion, does he
have the protection of Section 8(a)(1) in the course of an
interview with his employer. 142
Member Kennedy's dissent indicated that deference to the
grievance-arbitration machinery, rather than a finding of an unfair
labor practice, might be appropriate, and that there was a past
bargaining history where union demands for company-union discus-
sions before discipline had been rejected. 143 In addition, the dissent
argued that the Board should also consider in representation cases
the disruptive effect on the employer's operations. 144
In Western Electric Co. 145 interviews without union representa-
tives were held despite requests for representation, and disciplinary
action was subsequently taken. The Board panel dismissed the
complaint. Members Kennedy and Penello voted for dismissa1 146 on
the basis of the same grounds set forth in Member Kennedy's dis-
sents in Quality Manufacturing"' and Mobil Oil. 148 Chairman Mil-
ler voted to dismiss on different grounds. He suggested that in a case
in which the bargaining agreement did not mention the right to
union representation at the investigatory interview and in the ab-
sence of past practice of any kind on the issue, the employees would
probably have a section 7 right to engage in concerted activity to
obtain representation at the interview, which they could enforce
through an unfair labor practice charge before the Board. However,
in Western Electric, arbitration decisions had on two previous occa-
sions interpreted the existing contract as not conferring a right of
representation, and the union had failed to persuade the employer to
14° Id. {emphasis added).
141 See text at note 130 supra.
142 80 L.R.R.M. at 1193 (dissenting opinion).
1 " Id. at 1194 (dissenting opinion).
I" Id. (dissenting opinion).
145 198 N.L.R.B, No. 82, 80 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1972).
146 80 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
147 See text at note 130 supra.
I" See text at note 142 supra.
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accede to such a right in subsequent contract negotiations. 149
 Thus,
Chairman Miller reasoned that since there was within the company
an established past practice of not allowing representation at inves-
tigatory interviews which had been upheld in binding arbitration,
the union should not be allowed to skirt this past practice by
bringing an unfair labor practice charge against the employer.""
E. Summary
By way of summarizing this variety of opinions,' 5 ' there would
seem to be agreement on preliminary points. Not all meetings, and
apparently not all disciplinary interviews, are subject to representa-
tion. If the meeting is only explanatory in nature, even though
matters subject to bargaining are explained, the union does not have
a right to be present. If the meeting is disciplinary in character, but
explanatory in the sense that the employee is only told what the
employer intends to do and does not call upon the employee to
defend himself, no representation need be provided. It is an open
question as to how far the Board will go in reviewing what was
actually said in the meeting. The present indications are that the
Board does not give an intensive review of what was actually said
and how it was said, thus limiting the right to representation to only
very obvious cases.
The employee is protected from discipline if he asks for rep-
resentation, and one would expect he would be advised by unions to
request representation in most situations. If the request becomes
insubordinate, the employee may be disciplined for the insubordina-
tion.
At one time, the Board appeared to dismiss complaints based
on denial of representation, in part because the employee was able
to obtain a subsequent de novo hearing on the discipline or dis-
charge. However, this reasoning is not compelling if one accepts
analogies from the criminal law and from some administrative law
areas. A de novo hearing means little, for example, where the
employee has signed a statement, has taken a lie detector test, or has
given ill-considered responses which he later contradicts. In short,
the de novo hearing may not actually have been de novo.
At this same time, the Board was attempting to distinguish
149 80 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
150 Id.
51
 For other analysis, see Right to Demand Union Representation During Investigative
Interview by Employer, 79 Lab. Rel. Rep, Anal. 25 (Feb. 14, 1972); Right of Employee to
Representation By Union at Investigative Interview, 80 Lab. Rel. Rep. Anal. 61 (Aug. 14,
1972); Right of Employee to Union Representation at Meeting Called By Employer, 83 Lab.
Rel. Rep. Anal. 49 (July 30, 1973).
28
UNION REPRESENTATION
between fact-finding investigations and other investigations. Pre-
sumably, a fact-finding investigation did not give rise to a duty to
honor the request for representation. It seems clear that the Board's
distinction, while theoretically meaningful, was not operationally
meaningful because the Board did not appear to be actually weigh-
ing all of the important circumstances of the matter, or making a
thorough determination of whether the interview really was devoted
solely to fact-finding. Moreover, the Board seemed to expand the
notion from fact-finding about the individual employee to
fact-finding in general. In the latter case, the fact-finding distinction
becomes one without substance. In many cases turning on the
fact-finding distinction, the employer had all the facts needed for
discipline from other modes of investigation, and the interrogator
sought only to have the employee confirm the prior investigation,
that is, to confess. A serious effort to weigh the circumstances of the
interrogation could give rise to a workable rule within the
fact-finding/investigation distinction, but the Board did not develop
the needed criteria, and it has subsequently changed its approach to
the problem.
At the same time that the Board was developing the
fact-finding/investigation distinction and the line of cases allowing a
refusal of representation based on the existence of a de novo hear-
ing, the Board was attempting to draw a distinction between the
interrogation and the grievance process, setting up a pre-grievance
and grievance distinction. This distinction is not at all clear in the
cases or commentaries. Furthermore, the distinction was made
without reference to the individual's section 9(a) right to present a
grievance and the union's right to be present at its resolution. The
request for representation could be considered an individual presen-
tation of a grievance and the employer's answer could be a resolu-
tion of that grievance. Since the union has a right under section 9(a)
to be present at the resolution of the grievance, the attempt to
distinguish grievances from employee requests or demands under
9(a) becomes very difficult. While this argument may not be con-
vincing, it is difficult to see how the problem can be resolved
without more consideration being given to the rights granted or
protected by section 9(a).
A new direction which some members of the Board have taken,
creating a division of opinion within the Board, involves the ques-
tion of whether the issue of representation is solely one of contract or
whether a section 7 right is involved, which gives the employee the
choice, based on reasonable grounds that his answer might affect his
employment status, of not responding if union representation is
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denied. Those members who rely on contract analysis contend that
bargaining and arbitration are the answer, 152 which relieves the
Board from making a difficult decision. There is no indication
whether the issue of representation at an interview would be a
mandatory or permissive subject of bargaining, and there is no
indication of how the existence of bargaining on this issue would
affect the union's duty of fair representation, which might itself give
rise to an alleged unfair labor practice. Those who rely on the
section 7 analysis are left with the difficult, but not impossible, task
of deciding each case of denial on its particular circumstances,
gradually establishing landmarks which will guide the employer, the
employee, and the union.
Viewed only in light of the Board's decisions, the employer is in
a dilemma when the employee makes the protected request for union
representation. Depending on the Board panel involved, the result
might turn on the contract, on the fact-finding/investigation distinc-
tion, or on the reasonable apprehension of the employee about the
consequences of the interview. The first thing the employer probably
should do is distinguish explanatory from investigatory meetings.
Probably one of the more meaningful distinctions is whether the
employee is required to defend himself. Assuming that the interview
can be classified as one which might give rise to a right of represen-
tation, the employer apparently can still interrogate. If the employee
requests representation, the employer then has the choice of allow-
ing representation or terminating the interview. This decision may
depend on whether the interview goes beyond fact-finding or puts
the employee in jeopardy. At this point there is no indication that
the employer must give the employee a warning and there are no
guides on what the role of the representative is. It has not been
determined whether the representative can present oral argument,
present argument on a record, present written argument, cross-
examine, or possibly perform all of these functions. Finally, it has
not been determined whether the right to representation extends
beyond union representatives to include lay friends or attorneys.
There is also some indication that overly coercive interrogation, in
the absence of representation, might give rise to a separate section
8(a)(1) violation. 153 Although the interrogation in the existing prece-
dent concerned union activity, it would appear that excessive coer-
cion itself might be the basis for an invasion of section 7 rights in
other interview situations. Finally, it must be noted that, taking all
of the employer-employee confrontation cases together, in most of
them the Board denied the right to representation. Moreover, the
152 See text at notes 149-50 supra.
153 See text at notes 124-25 supra.
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courts of appeals have uniformly rejected the right to representation
even in cases in which the Board has found such a right to exist.' 54
IV. UNION CONTRACTS
Some decisions of the NLRB draw a correlation between a right
to representation and the terms of the contract. In Western Electric
Co. 55 the Board's opinion spoke of permitting "parties, by agree-
ment, to determine how representation rights shall be channeled," 156
and Member Kennedy has said that "the right to union representa-
tion during an interview with an employer must . .. be based on
contract." 157 Several provisions of the contract may be relevant to a
determination of the right to representation, including the manage-
ment prerogative clause and the grievance procedure clauses, as well
as any other contractual clauses specifically in point.
It should be noted here that no effort is being made to exhaus-
tively survey all contract provisions and no attempt is being made to
examine the actual practices under the contract, even though actual
practice under the contract frequently differs from its provisions. 158
A recent General. Motors Corporation collective bargaining
agreement is illustrative of a contract having provisions relating to
representation. The management responsibility provision provides
that "[t]he right to . . . discharge or discipline for cause; and to
maintain discipline and efficiency of employes, is the sole responsi-
bility of the Corporation . . ." 159 A four step grievance procedure is
provided. At Step One, the employee-foreman level, the foreman is
required to call a union committeeman into the discussion without
delay upon the request of the employee. 160 Higher steps directly
involve the union; hence the question of representation is obviously
mooted for these purposes. The higher step provisions, however, are
important in another respect. They specifically provide for a union
investigation at both Steps Two' 6 ' and Three.' 62 The Step Three
investigation procedures are quite detailed as to purpose, manner,
and procedure of the investigation.' 63 It would seem likely that to
154 Sec NLRB v: Quality Mfg. Co,, — F.2d 	 83 L.R.R.M. 2817 (4th Cir. 1973);
Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 142, 70 L.R.R.M. 3045 (5th Cir.
1969).
135 198 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 80 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1972).
156 80 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
"7 Quality Mfg., 79 L.R.R.M. at 1274 (dissenting opinion),
156
 Whyte, The Grievance Procedure and Plant Society, in The Grievance Process,
Proceedings of A Conference 12 (Mich. State Univ., March 23-24, 1956).
"9 General Motors Corp. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 59,905.08 (1971).
I" General Motors Corp. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 11 59,905.15 (1971),
161 General Motors Corp. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 59,905.16 (1971).
161
 General Motors Corp. Contract, CCH Lab, L. Rep. ¶ 59,905.17 (1971).
163 Id.
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the extent that union representatives are involved in the early inves-
tigation of an incident, particularly a potentially serious incident,
such early involvement would lessen the need for a subsequent,
detailed investigation. The General Motors contract also specifically
covers the investigatory interview. The contract provides:
Any employe who, for the purpose of being inter-
viewed concerning discipline, is called to the plant, or
removed from his work to the foreman's desk or to an
office, or called to an office, may, if he so desires, request
the presence of his District Committeeman to represent
him during such interview.'"
Similar provisions can be found in other contracts. The United
States Steel Corporation contract provides as follows:
An employee who is summoned to meet in an office
with a supervisor other than his own immediate supervisor
for the purpose of discussing possible disciplinary action
shall be entitled to be accompanied by his grievance com-
mitteeman ... if he requests such representation, provided
such representative is then available, and provided further
that, if such representative is not then available, the
employee's required attendance at such meeting shall be
deferred only for such time during that shift as is necessary
to provide opportunity for him to secure the attendance of
such representative. 1 65
Probationary employees may be dealt with in a different manner
than regular employees under some contracts. 166
The General Electric contract provides one procedure for seri-
ous offenses and a separate procedure for non-serious offenses. For
serious offenses (e.g., insubordination, fighting, willful destruction
of property), the employee "shall be advised in writing, a copy of
which shall be given to the Union, stating the reason for the disci-
pline or discharge." 167
 For non-serious offenses, oral and written
notices are used, and the union's role appears to be limited to the
161 General Motors Corp. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 9 59,905.26 (1971). Discipline
and discharge may be synonymous, as the same provision provides: "any employe who has
been disciplined by a suspension, layoff or discharge . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
"5
 United States Steel Corp. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 11 59,908.27 (1972).
' 66
 INlothing in this Article contained shall be construed to affect the probationary
status of employees during the first three (3) months of their employment, or to limit
in any respect the Company's prerogatives herein to discharge or take any other
action towards such employees during said period in its sole discretion.
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 11 59,911.06 (1969).
167
 General Electric Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 11 59,915.045 (1971).
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grievance processes. "The supervisor will orally discuss with the
employee the nature of the offense and the necessity for corrective
action . . . . 5)168
Some contracts impliedly exclude the union representative from
management activities prior to a formal grievance by provisions
which state, for example, that "[Ole Local Union President will be
notified promptly when an employee has been indefinitely sus-
pended, discharged or involuntarily separated." 169 Some contracts
also distinguish individual complaints from complaints affecting
many workers. Often in the latter situation, only the higher griev-
ance steps may be involved, which usually means direct union
involvement. 170 Some contracts also distinguish levels of union pres-
ence in grievance procedures, and make specific provision as to
when the international representative can appear to assist the local
representative.'"
To the extent that a union representative is to be present at a
meeting or interview, many contracts limit representation to desig-
nated representatives,'" Some contracts provide the conditions
under which the union representative may leave his station, for
example, by notifying the foreman and returning without delay.'"
The NLRB has given considerable discretion to management in
requiring that grievances be presented at a reasonable time and in a
reasonable manner.' 74
Some types of employment require special rules. For example,
in the trucking industry, not only may the availability of union
representation be involved, but the employee may be far from the
employer's place of business at the time of investigation or decision.
The National Master Freight Agreement provides that a discharge
or suspension must be appealed within ten days, or within ten days
after an employee returns to the home terminal if he is out on the
road when the disciplinary action is taken. 175
Other special procedures may be used. For example, in some
contracts, potentially emotional issues such as demotions, layoffs,
and discharges are expedited by eliminating the lower level griev-
ance steps to promote faster settlements. This procedure serves to
cool employee emotions, to reduce the total amount of time and
lba General Electric Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 59,915.050 (1971).
169 B.F. Goodrich Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 11 59,917.026 (1971).
1 " See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 59,917.020 (1971);
Brooklyn Union Gas Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 11 59,911.19 (1969).
171 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 1; 59,917.024 (1971).
' 72 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 11 59,917.0273 (1971). See
also B. Crane & R. Hoffman, Successful Handling of Labor Grievances 90-91 (1956).
173 See B. Crane & R. Hoffman, supra note 172, at 100.
Santa Clara Lemon Ass'n, 116 N.L.R.B. 44, 64, 38 L.R.R,M. 1189, 1190 (1956)..
'71 Nation Master Freight Agreement, CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 59,944.77 (1971).
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money spent on grievance processing, and in an improper discharge
case, it may reduce the amount of back pay owed to the
employee.' 76
By way of comparison with the industrial contracts, one can
look to the detailed' rules of the United States Civil Service Commis-
sion. Actions against employees are divided generally into two
classes: (1) removal or suspension for more than thirty days, and (2)
suspensions of thirty days or less.'" In the event of a suspension for
more than thirty days, the employee is entitled to "at least 30 full
days' advance written notice stating any and all reasons, specifically
and in detail, for the proposed action." 178
 This provision refers to
notice of the proposed action, not notice after the adverse action has
been taken. During the thirty day period the employee is entitled to
answer orally or in person. No provision is specifically made grant-
ing or prohibiting representation, although the nature of the
notice—"including statements of witnesses, documents, and inves-
tigative reports" 179
—indicates that it is unlikely that the employee
will have to go alone.'" Additionally, no provision is made
specifically for the investigatory interview, but the provision for
notice does give the employee some of the advantages of early
representation. After these preliminary actions, the action can be
appealed; at which time representation is specifically provided.'"
For suspensions of thirty days or less, notice is also required, and
the employee is entitled to a reasonable period of time in which to
file a written answer. 182
While the Civil Service Commission regulations are not totally
comprehensive, they differ from collective bargaining contracts in
several significant ways. One is the detail involved in the grievance
process, which is considerably greater than the usual contract. Sec-
ondly; the regulations distinguish discharge and serious discipline
from less serious discipline. Bargaining agreements often treat dis-
charge and all levels of discipline in the same procedural manner.
Finally, the regulations provide the employee with notice and an
opportunity to answer after he has had time to assemble his own
Case.
In summarizing the contract provisions, obviously a bare read-
178
 B. Crane & R. Hoffman, supra note 172, at 57 (1956).
177
 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.201, .301 (1973).
178
 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(01) (1973).
178
 5 C.F.R. § 752.202(a)(2) (1973).
180
 Exceptions on notice or continuation of duties are made for emergencies, reasonable
cause to believe an employee is guilty of a crime for which a sentence of imprisonment can be
imposed, or where continuation in that position would be detrimental. 5 C.F.R. §§ 752.202(c),
(d) (1973).
181
 5 C.F.R. § 771.105(a)(2) (1973).
182 5 C.F,R, § 752.302 (1973).
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ing of the contract will not reveal the employees' total rights because
much will depend upon past practices and bargaining history. The
contract is most likely to be ambiguous on the subject of representa-
tion and the parties' bargaining history may become determinative,
but in all likelihood the definition of the details of the right will be
left to arbitration.
If the Board's panel which looks to the contract holds sway,
there is some probability that the subject of representation will
become increasingly important at the bargaining table. If the union
and company are bargaining, several considerations may well be
involved if the parties agree on terms. The right can be specifically
limited to discharge, as opposed to other types of discipline. The
personnel who may be representatives can be limited; indeed the
whole right can apparently be waived. The role of the representative
can be defined. The conditions of the representation can be de-
lineated. For example, permission to leave one's work station may
be required, the time to be spent on it may be reasonably limited,
and the pay or non-pay status of the representative may be deter-
mined. There remains, however, the high probability that, like
other terms in the contract, many of the essential details will be left
ambiguous, just as most contract details surrounding discharge and
discipline remain ambiguous.
V. ARBITRATION DECISIONS
In addition to looking to the courts, the NLRB, and the collec-
tive bargaining contracts for information on the character of the
right to representation during the ' investigatory proceedings, it is
useful to look to the decisions of arbitrators. No attempt will be
made to be exhaustive, in part because no arbitrator is obligated to
follow another arbitrator's decision, although there are many prece-
dents in arbitration. 183
The touchstone for the arbitrator is the contract, which encom-
passes the limits of his authority. Yet contracts normally do not spell
out in detail the procedures to be used in discipline and discharge
cases. 184 Fair procedure, even though not spelled out in a contract,
'" "While some arbitrators show great deference to the precedent value of prior awards
and others hold the precedent value of prior awards to a minimum, the great majority of
arbitrators view prior awards as persuasive but not binding." Are Prior Arbitration Awards
Binding?, CCH Lab. L. Rep. if 58,602, at 84,313 (1970). "There has been developed over the
years a considerable body of principles through the arbitration of discipline disputes . . . ."
Myers, Concepts of Industrial Discipline, in Management Rights and the Arbitration Process:
Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 59, 64 (J.
McKelvey ed. 1956).
Wolff, Discussion, in Critical Issues in Labor Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tenth
Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 56, 58 (J. McKelvey ed. 1957). See also 0.
Phelps, Discharge and Discipline in the Unionized Firm 74 (1959); S. Slichter, J. Healy, & E.
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often plays an' important role in aiding the arbitrator to fill in the
details of the collective bargaining relationship. 185 The role of the
arbitrator may extend beyond the scope of his immediate decision.
"Oftentimes the very way in which parties settle grievances is de-
termined by their best guess as to how an arbitrator might dispose of
the case." 188
When the contract is explicit as to the scope of the arbitrator's
authority, the more liberal the phraseology, the greater the scope of
authority of the arbitrator. While some contracts speak in the tradi-
tional terms of discharge "for just and proper cause,"' 87 other con-
tracts may speak in apparently broader terms, such as: "Should it be
decided under the rules of the Agreement that an injustice has been
dealt the mine worker . . ." 188
Procedural due process can be an important consideration in
the arbitrator's decision. The arbitrator has a wide range of pos-
sibilities in affording a remedy for a lack of procedural fairness. He
can reverse the discharge or discipline, with or without back pay, or
he can mitigate the discipline. Since he is not confined to the
damages-or-nothing mode of remedy of the judicial system,' 89 the
arbitrator can give effect to the nuances of procedural fairness. ' 9° In
considering the aspect of procedural fairness within the right to
representation in an investigatory interview, the character of the
investigation is important. The investigation may be incomplete
from at least two perspectives: one is that the employer did not have
enough facts to prove that the employee violated a plant rule; the
other is that while the employer may have had sufficient evidence if
taken alone, the original evidence would be insubstantial when
viewed in light of other mitigating facts. From the first perspective,
Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management 768 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as S. Slichter].
199
 Jones, Ramifications of Back-Pay Awards in Suspension and Discharge Cases, in
Arbitration and Social Change: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators 163-74 (G. Somers ed. 1969):
One cannot escape the conviction that in many cases of reinstatement without back
pay, the basis for reinstating the individual to work was simply the arbitrator's
belief, based on some unknown standard of fair play, that the individual should
have another chance . . . .
"16 S. Slichter, supra note 184, at 741.
"" Brooklyn Union Gas Co. Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 1I 59,911.20 (1969).
189
 Bituminous Coal Contract, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 1i 59,914.014 (1968).
189 See Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements: A Preliminary Analysis, 9
Buffalo L. Rev. 239, 250 (1960).
196
 But see Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in The Arbitrator and The Parties:
Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators 1 (J. McKelvey
ed. 1958):
To speak of "due process of arbitration" is to risk a seeming confusion of terms.
For "due process" is a symbol borrowed from the lexicon of law, and therefore
suspect in this shirtsleeves, seat-of-the-pants, look?-no-hands business of arbitration.
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investigatory interrogation of the individual may be imperative, but
from the second perspective, the more complete picture may result
from an investigation aided by the resources of union representation.
Management's overall record in discipline cases is not so outstanding
as to indicate that more union input is unneeded at the investigatory
stage. "Available evidence indicates that management's disciplinary
decisions have not fared well at the hands of arbitrators." 19 ' If
union representation would improve this record, the implication is
obvious.
The role of representation at the arbitration level should be
briefly considered. Obviously the union is representing the employee
at the arbitration hearing, but there remains the question of whether
the grievant can also bring in counsel of his or her own choosing, in
addition to the union. An argument can be made that if independent
representation is not provided at arbitration, given the possible
disinterest of the union in the individual, the absence of any rep-
resentation at the investigation may not be so serious.
However one may view these preliminary points, some arbi-
trators have considered the procedural due process questions. In All
American Stamp and Premium Corp. 192 three employees were fired
for refusing to appear for an investigatory interview. The employees
requested representation, the request was denied, and a deadline
was placed on their appearance. The arbitrator held the discharges
improper:
Any person in civil or criminal law is entitled to rep-
resentation, and the courts will delay the case a reasonable
time to enable a party to obtain counsel. . . . [This
interview . . . could have been delayed for a reasonable
period of time at no disadvantage to the Company. But
instead, these grievants were given an ultimatum and in
effect, felt that they were on trial . . . . In labor relations,
as in law, an employee is entitled to representation by
higher authority in the Union organization.' 93
In Thrifty Drug Stores Co. 194 grievants had been implicated by
others in a theft from the company. Union representation was re-
quested but denied in some cases, or not proffered by the employer
in other cases. The question was whether the grievants had commit-
ted theft, and the arbitrator found the case to turn on the reliability
of the statements of others made without representation. The arbi-
1 " S. Slichter, supra note 184, at 657.
191 65-1 CCH Lab. Arb. Awards 9 8091 (1965) (May, Arbitrator).
193 Id. at 3360.
50 Lab. Arb. 1253 (1968) (Jones, Arbitrator).
37
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
trator found the statements to be unreliable. He looked at the
Miranda decision in the criminal law area, saying:
Of course, we are not here concerned with "the forces
of the law." Our setting is an industrial one .... Nor are
we directly concerned . . . with the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. But our concern is not unlike
that of the Courts when they are coping with the testimo-
nial privilege or with custodial interrogations by police. We
must determine whether there was truth-telling despite
these custodial interrogations as they were conducted in the
Company's security cubicles in the absence of union
representatives. 195
The arbitrator refused to accept the "pre-grievance" characterization
of the interrogation, reasoning that since discipline was a potential
outcome of the interview, the employees had a contractual right to
be represented by the union, and the employer was required to
inform them of this right.' 96 However, no contract provisions were
cited.
Not all arbitration decisions are favorable to representation.
Some arbitrators look solely to the contract. In one case, the em-
ployee was interviewed concerning thefts of company property. Dur-
ing the interview, the employee signed a statement concerning a
company-owned lawnmower that had been removed from the plant,
signed a document consenting to a general search of his home, and
signed a document consenting to a polygraph test. The employee
then talked with his attorney-brother who advised him not to allow
the search unless the employer would limit it to a search for specified
property. The employer would not agree and the consent was with-
drawn. The employer refused to allow the attorney-brother or other
witness to be present at a subsequent interview. When the employee
refused to be interviewed, he was discharged. The arbitrator denied
the grievance, relying on the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement, which contained no provision for representation at such
an interview.'" The arbitrator also rejected the obvious analogies to
constitutional law: "However, where these constitutional rights were
raised in the cited authorities, they generally involved the sovereign
195 Id. at 1260-61. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
I " 50 Lab. Arb, at 1262.
' 97
 Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co., 71-1 Cal Lab. Arb. Awards ¶ 8274, at
3959 (1971) (Rohman, Arbitrator): "Further, when the grievant repeated he wanted ... his
brother . . . to go in with him—the Company was not obligated to honor this request, as
nowhere pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement is there a requirement for such
procedure."
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power—the State—rather than the private rights flowing from a
Company-employee relationship."'"
In South Central Bell Telephone Co. 199 two employees were
denied their request for representation at investigatory interviews.
The arbitrator rested his decision on the basis that the investigatory
interview was not part of the grievance procedure and that the
contract provided for union representation only in the grievance
procedure. He argued that abandoning the grievance/pre-grievance
distinction would increase, rather than decrease, the confusion over
the representation issue. 20° The arbitrator also rejected the notion
that the request for representation was itself a grievance. "[T]he
Union argues that after these oral grievances were presented, Union
representation at the interview should have been permitted. This
contention, however, is clearly an effort by the Union to pull itself
up by its own bootstraps . . ." 201
Commentators on the labor scene have expressed great concern
about the need for fair play and due process in the discipline-
grievance machinery. One summary states that
The first step in the process of according fair and just
treatment to a person accused of wrong-doing is to find out
exactly what it was that he did. . . . Mt has also been the
reason for most arbitration cases in the field of procedural
due process. 2 °2
Another commentator states: "An essential part of any investigation
is to give the employee affected full opportunity to explain his
actions." 203
 The need for obtaining full information and for giving
the employee an opportunity to state his case highlights the potential
problems involving the representative. The presence of a representa-
tive at the investigatory interview might be justified by the idea that
it will protect the employee and it might enhance the efficiency of
the investigation. If the employee tells an incomplete story the first
time, he may have difficulty , correcting it later and being
believed. 2" On matters of credibility, when the choice is either to
believe the employee or to believe the supervisor, .the supervisor
19$ Id.
199 59 Lab. Arb..134 (1972) (Seward, Arbitrator). ,
200
 Id. at 139. .
201 Id.
202 Discipline: Procedural Due Process, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 58.572, at 84,212-13 (1970)
(emphasis in the original).
2°3 S. Slichter, supra note 184, at 646.
2°4 Cf. Insubordination: The Safety Exception, CCH Lab. L. Rep. ¶ 58.545, at 84,136
(1969).
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may receive the benefit of the doubt. 205 The presence of a represen-
tative might help the employee with his story, thus helping man-
agement with its ultimate decision. However, the union representa-
tive might not, in fact, be able to be of assistance. 206
On the other hand, it can be argued that if the more experi-
enced lower level union representative does not have a complete
grasp of the matter, it is even less likely that an individual employee
will be competent to give best expression to his position. This is
more likely to be true of the newer employee and it is the newer
employee who is more likely to face a discharge situation. 207
Some commentators have emphasized the desirability of max-
imum management-union participation in the investigatory
process. 208 The goal here is to maximize the efficiency of the system,
as viewed by all of the participants—union, employer, and indi-
vidual. "In effect a company must now proceed in discipline with
the expectation that its action will be subjected to the most search-
ing examination . . . ." 209 The examination is most likely to occur in
cases involving severe discipline. It is known that unions have a
high rate of success in contesting grievances over the discipline
issue, and the rate rises as the severity of the discipline inreases. 21 °
The discipline-grievance system can be more profitably viewed
in its total perspective, ranging from initial hiring and developing of
plant rules through contract negotiation and arbitration. To achieve
a successful grievance system, both the union and employer must be
willing to expend as much energy in preventing disputes as in
settling them. 2 " One commentator states: "It may well be advisable
for unions and management to approach disciplinary problems with
less emphasis on defending individuals or prosecuting individuals.
2 ° 5
 Alcoholism, Drinking and Intoxication, CCH Lab. L. Rep. 4 58.506, at 84,023
(1969).
206 T .j Kuhn, Bargaining in Grievance Settlement 119 (1961):
Union officers and chief representatives in most of the locals estimate that not
more than half and frequently as few as 25 per cent of all shop stewards or
committeemen can without help competently advise workers, write up grievances,
and process complaints, .
207 Ross, The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: What Happens After Reinstatement, in
Critical Issites in Labor Arbitration: Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators 21, 29 (J.. McKelvey ed. 1957).
Zoe
	 Phelps, supra note 184, at 113-14:
[There is much to be said for letting the union share the responsibility throughout.
. If the objective is equity, the two parties together can do a better job than
working separately and in opposition.... There is no obvious reason why the same
, theory should not apply to prior notification and consultation, as well as to joint rule
formulation and interpretation.
1 " S. Slichter, supra note 184, at 646.
21 ° 0: Phelps, supra note 184, at 139.
211
 J. Kuhn; supra note 206, at 42.
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More attention to cooperation from a broader viewpoint will better
serve the needs of both." 212
While the Board may feel inhibited in drawing analogies be-
tween the investigatory interview and other areas of the law, 213
arbitrators may not feel as restricted. Indeed, the arbitrator is likely
to look to other areas of the law for analogies, and it is easy to find
analogies which support the employee's request for representation,
particularly if contract terms, past practices, and bargaining history
permit. Decisions by other arbitrators are also available to serve as
precedents if precedents are applicable. A great many factors enter
into the arbitration process, however, and by the time the arbitrator
is ready to make a decision, the multitude of variables unrelated to
representation may play a predominant role in denying the right in a
particular case. If the discipline-grievance system is viewed as a
whole, the earlier a true picture of what actually happened can be
developed, the better it will be for all parties concerned. There are
no studies upon which to base a conclusion, but representation at
some interviews might contribute to faster and more accurate
fact-finding.
VI. OVERVIEW
A. Analogies
One of the strongest forces influencing the demand for the right
of representation is the development of the right to counsel in other
areas of the law, particularly in the criminal and administrative law
areas. This right appears likely to continue to expand in the long
run. As long as this trend continues, it is also probable that demands
for analogous rights will be felt in the labor relations field. The more
severe the discipline, the greater will be the demand, particularly in
an economy that has significant unemployment. The right to rep-
resentation in these other areas is not apt to be transferred in an
unaltered state, but the NLRB's summary rejection of Escobedo 214
is unlikely to be the last opinion on the matter.
Procedural due process is an important part of labor relations.
It is the basis of many arbitration decisions; it is important in the
union's duty of fair representation; and it has been written into the
union's relationship with its members. Its importance is also likely to
expand, particularly when the reasons for denying the right turn on
such questionable distinctions as that between a grievance and a
pre-grievance situation, and between fact-finding and discipline in
2 i Myers, supra note 183, at 75.
133 See text at notes 122-23 supra.
214
 Id.
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an interview in which confessions and detectives are used. It seems .
that the relationship will be one of analogy, rather than identity.
The right to counsel found in other areas is likely to be, at most, a
right to increased union representation. With a statutorily recog-
nized exclusive representative, the ability or need to use a lawyer
may be diminished.
B. Relationship of the Union and Employer
On the surface, it may seem that the right to union representa-
tion at the investigatory interview stage would result in a marked
increase in union power and yet another intrusion into the
employer's rights. The current law does not, however, make that
result inevitable because the problem is still in its infancy. It seems
more probable that, if it is generally granted, representation may not
be an unmitigated boon to the unions. If representation is permitted
or required, this development would seem to necessitate increased
union responsibility. When the representative is giving advice to the
employee or arguing on his behalf, it is likely that the employee and
union may be bound by what is said and done. If the union's advice
or actions are inappropriate, it will have to face the wrath of the
voting membership. Greater union responsibility at the outset in a
disciplinary matter may also make the use of subsequent steps in the
grievance procedures more predictable, with the result that fewer
actions may go to arbitration.
If the union obtains this new responsibility, it will probably
become a new facet of the duty of fair representation. The union's
exercise of its new responsibility would seemingly require that it
perform in a positive fashion at the request of the employee and not
on the basis of its own good faith evaluation of the matter. This
action would be required because of the preliminary character of the
proceedings. The union's representation would have to be measured
against some objective standard prohibiting discrimination in rep-
resentation and quite possibly requiring a minimum ability to advise
the employee of the consequences of various paths of action. Further
development of the right to representation should require an expan-
sion of the duty of fair representation to cover the new situation.
C. Unfair Labor Practice Approach
The unfair labor practice approach to the problem appears to
offer the greatest amount of flexibility in developing a right of
representation. This would appear true not only because the Board
can develop the needed criteria, but because the Board can also use
the expanded doctrine of deferral to arbitration 215 to let the parties
2'S
	
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
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work out most of the details, except in the more outrageous cases.
Through a combination of the unfair labor practice and deferral
approaches, the various panels of the Board might be able to reach a
common ground, giving greater certainty to the subject.
However the Board may approach the matter, greater attention
will have to be given to section 9(a) and the character of the
individual's rights. Section 9(a) is significant because it can be inter-
preted as giving the individual some rights as an individual that
may transcend his rights under a contract.
The unfair labor practice approach may seem to be unduly
harsh, particularly if the analogies to other areas of the law are
rejected. In the total labor relations context, however, employers do
not have unlimited authority to interrogate their employees. It is not
uncommon to find that the employer is prevented from interrogating
the employee in the recognition-representation election context. The
employer has a variety of tools available to detect employee miscon-
duct, including surveillance and trained detectives. Furthermore,
portions of the activity described in the cases might well involve
violations of the criminal law, with its panoply of detection tech-
niques and personnel. Finally, a closer reading of some of the fact
patterns may in the applicable cases point to violation of a particular
section: 8(a)(3) (discrimination to encourage or discourage union
membership) or section 8(a)(5). (failure to bargain in good faith) in
aspects of the interrogation itself. If the interview becomes a critical
stage by the use of prepared statements to be signed, and the union
could not be present, the 8(a)(3) implications become more evident.
If the union itself requests the right to representation the section
8(a)(5) implications become clearer.
Assuming that the unfair labor practice approach were to be
finally adopted as the Board's position, it would be necessary to
formulate guidelines on the exercise of the right. Based on what the
Board has discussed, the following breakdown, based largely on the
cases, represents at least some alternatives:
(1) Availability of the representative: anytime requested;
reasonably available while accommodating the production efficiency
goal; reasonably available with burden on employer to prove un-
availability resulted from actual production needs.
(2) Employee request: employee must specifically request rep-
resentation; employer gives employee choice to leave or to remain
without representation; employer gives employee choice to leave or
to remain without representation, but if he leaves prima facie case
will be held against employee.
(3) Role of representative: representative will actively represent
employee; representative will be a witness to the interrogation only.
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(4) State of mind: employer is intending to seek only investiga-
tory facts; employee reasonably fears adverse effects.
(5) Interrogator: interrogator with authority to discharge or
discipline; interrogator without authority to discharge or discipline;
interrogator who is a trained detective.
(6) Potential consequences: might affect employment or substan-
tial working conditions; common infraction relating to performance
or production which is not likely to have long term effect.
(7) Type of investigation: truly investigatory; goes beyond mere
fact-finding.
(8) Manner of interrogation: questions; presenting statement for
signature; presenting choice on use of lie detector; bargaining with
employee.
(9) Need for information: employer without other facts: em-
ployer with established prima facie case.
(10) Employee response: reasonable response; insubordinate
response.
(11) Character of person being interrogated: fluent in language;
not fluent in language.
The Board has not selected critically among the various pos-
sibilities listed above, almost all of which have been mentioned at
one time or another in Board decisions. Obviously the categories are
not necessarily exclusive, but a breakdown is needed for analysis.
Again assuming that the unfair labor practice approach were to be
adopted by the Board, the following choices among the alternatives
appear reasonable:
(1) Availability of the representative: Reasonable availability
should be based on a comparison of the need for representation and
production efficiency. The timing of the interrogation, by definition,
usually lies with the employer; hence the employer would need to
show that the call for interrogation was reasonably timed and the
rules of availability versus production were reasonable. It is un-
realistic to require a large employer to prove actual production
interference if the request for representation were met. If the em-
ployer times the interview so that representation could not be made
available, there would seem to be section 8(a)(5) considerations
involved.
(2) Employee request: It is likely that the employer need not
give the employee a "representation" warning. The union should
bear the responsibility for informing the employee of his rights and if
the employee does not exercise the right, then the problem lies
between him and his union. Any warning that would be required
would have to be phrased to apply to both union members and
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non-members to avoid discriminating between them. Since the mere
request is protected, the warning appears pointless.
(3) Role of the representative: It is unlikely that the representa-
tive would remain mute. Whatever the rule, actual participation
appears likely. Any bargaining with the employee would involve
section 8(a)(5) considerations; hence the silence of the representative
is probably not recommended.
(4) State of mind: This relates to other factors, but a rule
looking to the state of mind of either party (e.g., intend only
fact-finding, personally fear adverse consequences) would be
difficult to administer. The employee is always likely to feel in
jeopardy either from the beginning or at some point during the
interview. The "employer" is often several individuals at various
steps of the cases, and divining whether the questions were intended
to be aimed at eliciting only truly investigative facts is difficult.
Instead, the Board should look at the actual questions used and at
what the employer knew prior to the interview in light of the
potential consequences.
(5) Interrogator: Whether the interrogator has the authority to
discipline or discharge seems to be a nonproductive inquiry. Em-
ployers often use skilled detectives who can obtain maximum infor-
mation. From the employee's perspective, the detective without
authority to fire might be more menacing than the top personnel
manager. Whether or not the interrogator had disciplinary powers,
bargaining with the employee would be forbidden.
(6) Potential consequences: It seems reasonable to exclude inves-
tigatory interrogations not resulting in or potentially resulting in
fairly immediate serious discipline or discharge. Suspensions involv-
ing more than a specified number of days might be a dividing line,
as noted in the Civil Service regulations. 21 ' Interviews about routine
performance or common infractions could be excluded. The Board
has not sought to distinguish the potentially serious infraction from
the less serious, but the distinction is reasonable and can be
analogized to other areas of the law. While it is a difficult line to
draw, it is not an impossible task. Clearly not every employee-
employer contact would give rise to representation. However, look-
ing to the potential consequences would accord with the Board's
recent decisions (although not with its statements on employee's
state of mind) and would accord with tests used in analogous areas
of the law.
(7) Type of investigation: While the Board has tried to turn the
question on fact-finding versus non-fact-finding, the distinction is, to
216 See text at notes 177-82 supra.
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say the least, unclear. If the seriousness of the potential outcome
were a basis for distinction, it would eliminate the need for the
vague fact-finding distinction.
(8) Manner of interrogation: Clearly, an interrogation which
goes beyond questions to signing statements and using lie detectors
warrants a response to a request for representation even if no other
type of interrogation does. The questionable history of signing pre-
pared confessions is not so encouraging as to think that representa-
tion would be an unwarranted intrusion into management's preroga-
tives. While looking to potential consequences might be used as the
major test for representation, representation should be allowed in
any interview in which the employer's representatives become un-
duly coercive. If the rationale of investigation is to find true facts,
then coercion is not an acceptable or useful way of arriving at the
truth. Coercion of the employee would also seem to have an impact
on his section 7 rights to participate effectively in union activities.
(9) Need for information: The case for representation becomes
much stronger where the employer already has a prima facie case
against the employee. This accords with the Board's attempted
distinction between investigatory and non-investigatory interviews.
Where the employer has a case based on surveillance or other
techniques, the investigatory interview loses its investigatory over-
tones and comes closer to confirming the discipline decision. The
Board, however, has not looked at what the employer already
knew, and has not looked at the actual need for an investigatory
type of interview. It seems nevertheless to be an important distinc-
tion.
(10) Employee response: The Board has regularly held that
requests or responses of an insubordinate character are not pro-
tected, and this seems a highly reasonable approach.
(11) Character of the person being interrogated: While these
cases would be few in number, it would seem that where an em-
ployee has an obvious language difficulty or some other obvious
difficulty the interrogator is under a greater obligation to balance the
relationship. The Board has been silent on this point in the few
cases which present it.
Two other factors which the Board has not considered in this
context appear to be of additional significance:
(12) Character of the representative: It can be argued that a
"friend" could be the representative, particularly if section 9(a) is
relied upon. The representative should be either a neutral or an
authorized union representative. Those who have considered , this
aspect of the representation issue have condemned the notion of
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allowing a rival union to be the representative. 217 The limitation of
reasonable work rules might well be sufficient to restrict availability
to the union representative, who presumably would have more
flexibility to leave his station than would most other employees.
(13) Effect of representation: If the statute protects the request
for representation, then both the employer and the employee also
deserve protection. The actions of the employee based on the advice
of the representative should be found generally to be a binding
choice, and the statements of the employee would seem to be par-
ticularly credible when a representative is present. The employer's
subsequent decisions could be more firmly based upon the fact of
representation. By the same token, the union's duty of fair represen-
tation should be expanded to cover the interview situation. It would
then be an extremely rare situation in which the union could refuse
to honor the request, and the union would be bound by the decisions
of the representatives obliging the union to fairly represent the
employee. To date, the decisions have only related to the employer's
duty to allow the representative to be present, but the Board will
have to develop criteria on the union's responsibility. A one-sided
doctrine would be destined to ultimate failure.
D. Contract-Arbitration Approach
The question of representation has theoretically been a question
of contract for a long period of time. Some contracts deal with the
right to representation implicitly, but the recent increase in cases
suggests that the issue has not been generally resolved at the con-
tract level. It is probable that the matter will come before the
bargaining table with greater frequency as the courts expand the
procedural protections of individuals in other areas.
The contract approach offers great potential to the parties to
tailor the right of representation to their particular needs if agree-
ment can be reached. Considerabk leeway has been given as to the
manner, time, method, pay status, and priorities of grievance reso-
lution. Representation can be as broad or as narrow as circum-
stances require, and unnecessary infringement on employer or em-
ployee rights can be avoided. This being so, it nevertheless remains
true that labor contracts are not characterized by great detail in
grievance resolution provisions. By the same token, it must also be
recognized that serious discipline cases are given the closest scrutiny
in arbitration, and the arbitration forum is probably the most favor-
able forum for the recognition of procedural rights, including rep-
resentation.
217 See text at note 46 supra.
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The arbitration approach is closely tied to the contract ap-
proach, since the availability of arbitration depends upon the terms
of the contract. Arbitration can also be related to the unfair labor
practice approach through the deferral criteria of the Board. Be-
cause of the interrelatedness of arbitration to the other approaches,
it would seem possible that the greatest development of the nature of
representation will be found in the decisions of arbitrators, rather
than in the decisions of the Board.
To the extent that one can generalize about arbitrators' deci-
sions, their concern with procedural due process seems to increase
with the severity of the consequences. It is also likely that the
arbitrator will look at the manner in which the representative per-
forms his function, just as it was suggested that the union's duty of
fair representation should become involved in the investigatory in-
terview.
One could also argue that early union representation might
define the issues more completely at an earlier stage and thus would
involve, important union decisions and investigations earlier. This
process could have the effect of reducing the role of arbitration
somewhat since the parties might reach agreement sooner. The
effect would be similar, perhaps, to adding another step to the
grievance process, albeit a preliminary step. On the other hand, case
loads could increase solely on the question of whether a representa-
tive should have been present, or on the effect of the representative's
actions during the interview. The decisions of arbitrators, based on
such a great variety of factors, offer an agreed-upon forum in which
the basic concepts of industrial due process can be developed.
WI. CONCLUSION
The question of the right of the employee to representation at
the investigatory interview illustrates that the grievance process is in
fact a continuing process. The process begins when the employee is
hire'd and trained, and ends only after a final discharge. To separate
out parts of the process and to accord rights based upon the label
given to a segment of the 'process is unrealistic and ignores what the
employee knows to be a continuous process.
Developments in analogous areas of law are characterized by an
increasing sensitivity to the general question of representation. This
sensitivity has resulted; in some measure, from a close scrutiny of
the procedural fairness within the judicial or administrative pro-
cesses in question. The -NLRB, the courts, and the arbitrators might
benefit from a closer weighing of the facts of the investigatory
interview to -determine whether the employee either needs or is
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entitled to representation. Some of the elements of such a scrutiny
have been suggested above. An increased emphasis on individual
rights, protected by the NLRA, might give a truer answer to the
problem than the current tendency to view the matter as a struggle
between management and the union. While a finding of a right to
representation in appropriate cases might infringe somewhat upon
current management prerogatives, the recognition of such a right
should also require a higher degree of responsibility on the part of
the union by way of the duty of fair representation. The union's
potential responsibility has been almost ignored to date; yet recogni-
tion of this factor would put the problem in a much clearer focus.
The central point in this discussion is the individual employee.
The union, upon certification, is the exclusive statutory representa-
tive of the majority, but the individual's identity is not lost in that
process. It is usually not the union, but the individual who first
raises the representation question. It is the individual who seeks
representation, be it from the union or another source. In our
increasingly dependent society, in the context of an employment
situation in which collective action is the norm, it seems to be an
anomaly to see the individual not merely standing alone, but being
forced to stand alone on matters intimately related to his or her
economic existence.
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